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Fidel Castro Redux:
Old Revolutionaries Resisting New Revolutions Castro was reported to have said to a group of astonished diplomats in Havana: If these changes go on in the USSR, they will soon be describing us as those madmen in the Albania of the Caribbean." Whether this is a piece of the apocrypha or an actual interview, the fact is that Albania and Cuba remain, albeit for quite different reasons, holdouts in the revolutions which have swept Communist regimes from power in Eastern Europe, and have roiled the political process within the Soviet Union proper. To be sure, and as hard as it may be to believe, there has been more movement toward reform in Albania in 1990 than in Cuba. It is entirely appropriate to explore the reasons for this apparent anomaly, in short, to find out why Cuba has been so singularly resistant to change. This is a necessary prelude to anticipating the type of changes that can be expected in the near future. Cuba: Stasis and Change The first reason I would adduce is the inherited version of Latin American militarism. Cuba is neither socialist nor Third World in the classical sense. Caudillismo is more prevalent in Cuba than in most Latin American societies; indeed, the caudillo image is probably truer for Cuba now than it has been in the past (pre-Castro) epoch. The armed forces of Cuba have occupied a most favored status from the outset of the Castro regime some thirty-one years ago. This has been overlooked, or better muted, because the extreme left was able to define the situation, insisting apon casual designations of Cuba as socialist or Communist. There was a presumption, entirely false as it turns out, that radical regimes tend to undercut longstanding Latin traditions of the military figure on horseback. But the military man in a tank is much the same thing. The key is not the horse or the--but the militarized character of the society. In fact, the military is the only social force that has been institutionalized in contemporary Cuba. As a result, it might well be the unique element in the Cuban cockpit that would fight to support rather than overthrow Castro in a showdown struggle. The 1999 purge of the armed forces by the Castro brothers drew attention to the unique status of the military as a potentially oppositional force. A second element is demographic displacement, that is, the drainage of revolutionary sentiment through the emigrations of malcontents and innovators to other shores--from Miami to Paris. It cannot be overlooked that, unlike East and West Europe, there is no 'wall' or border but an ocean between Cuba and the United States. Travel was restricted after the Cuban revolution, but for the impatient and insistent, entrepreneurs and convicts alike, it was continuous. As a result the most discontented and determined ended up in exile and not in armed insurrection against the regime. Castro in this sense learned well the lessons of sociology that permitting emigration is the functional equivalent of tranquilizing a discontented people. On the other hand, the U.S. must remain true to itself--as a home for the politically disenfranchised and the economically disadvantaged. Geographic isolation is a third item that played its part in undergirding the regime. A unique characteristic of many isolated societies ts their remoteness. External ideas and influences filter in only with difficulty, unlike, for example Poland to Hungary or Hungary to Romania. Cuba is an island society par excellence. As a result, it is capable of shutting down information, even from the USSR, at the whim of the leader. Insularity is built into the structure of Cuban geography no less than society. Local issues become global in perceived importance. Irritations, major and minor, that occur in nations which share common borders and uncommon social systems did not affect Castro's Cuba, at least not as a serious threat to the regime's stability. As a fourth element, there is the original leader syndrome. As shown by the example of Francisco Franco in Spain, long after the utility of a regime has vanished, its political structure persists; in part because the original leader remains intact, along with his charismatic residue. Charisma erodes slowly in the face of any lack of formal options. One tends to assume that a leader in power for more than three decades is there by virtue of divine right, like the divine right of kings. He often becomes exempt from criticism and immune from removal. That such a syndrome will not outlive Fidel is of small comfort to those anxious to move the process of democratization along now. In effect, the sheer physical survival of Fidel Castro, his biological continuation as it were, is itself an element in the original leader syndrome, not to mention a critical element forestalling great change. These considerations should not lead, however, to the politics of assassinations. First, because when it was first tried, it failed miserably. But more important, we have no assurance that the liquidation of Castro will bring about the end of the dictatorial regime. Despite a lack of popular base, Raúl, as the younger brother, could inherit all sorts of good will, and protract the period of dictatorship instead of bringing down the regime. Desperation politics is not desirable or necessary at this time. Despite all the signs of a coming rupture, the economic collapse of Castro's Cuba is prevented by continuing Soviet support. Cuba is unlike Poland and other nations of Eastern Europe that paid the USSR reparations and provided goods. Here the situation is reversed: the USSR pays Cuba roughly six billion dollars annuully, or one-fourth of its foreign aid, to remain in the Communist fold. This is starting in change, but its full impact has not hit home yet. While Soviet supplies to Cuba have slowed, these are still described in technical terms, i.e., a breakdown in shipping capacities, rather than a profound change in policies. There remains only limited evidence of a new policy over the long haul. What is clear is that Cuban industry as a whole is now operating as barely half its normal capacity. 1| 2
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