|
 |
Beyond Castro
The U. S. views and policy toward Castro's Cuba have been influenced by a variety of erroneous assumptions. First and foremost, there is the strong belief that economic considerations could influence Castro's policy decisions and that an economically deteriorating situation would force the Cuban leader to move Cuba toward a market economy and eventually toward political reforms. This has not happened. Castro has introduced limited economic reforms in an attempt to muddle through a difficult situation. Yet, the reforms are not structurally profound, nor are they propelling Cuba to the marketplace. In Cuba, economic decisions are influenced by political and ideological considerations. The second assumption is that leaders from other countries are very much like American leaders, except that they speak a different language. We assume that these leaders share our values and perceptions and that, therefore, they will behave as we do. We believe that we can negotiate with them most, if not all, of our mutual problems, that we can find common ground and work out differences. Nothing could be further from the truth. There are leaders, particularly in the developing world, that don't share Western values. They see the world very differently than we do. Perhaps the result of their educational and cultural background, perhaps the result of their own experiences, they think and act very differently. Iraq's Hussein, Libya's Qaddafi, and Cuba's Castro belong to this group. What characterizes these leaders is a self-righteous assurance that they know what's best for their countries, and an unwillingness to compromise their views even to the extent of sacrificing their people in the pursuit of their ideas. They are anti-Western and particularly anti-American. They have a commitment to remain in power, since they believe that no other individual can carry out the anointed task of transforming and leading their countries. Compromise is seen as a short-term, sometimes forced, tactical move to achieve long-term strategic objectives. Negotiations with these leaders are usually of little value, and agreements of short duration. America's long-held belief that, through negotiations and incentives, we can influence Castro's behavior has been weakened by Castro's unwillingness to provide major concessions to the United States or to other Western leaders. Castro prefers to sacrifice the economic well-being of his people rather than cave in to demands for a different Cuba, politically and economically Neither economic incentives nor punishment have worked with Castro in the past. They are not likely to work in the future. Which brings us to the obvious conclusion that not all differences and problems in international affairs can be solved through negotiations, or can be solved at all. This reality vitiates an assumption that has permeated American foreign policy for decades. There are international disputes that are not negotiable and can only be resolved either through the use of force or through prolonged patience until the leadership disappears or situations change. While some differences naturally can be solved through negotiations, others are irreconcilable. Yet, the belief that Cuba's economic crisis will lead to major political changes continues to permeate American thinking about Cuba. We seem to cling to an outdated economic determinism in trying to understand events in other societies and the motivations of their leaders. Despite growing economic difficulties, Castro has not budged, and the Cubans have not rebelled and forced out the present leadership. Optimistic appraisals of a rapid end to the Castro regime have been encouraged by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For many observers, Cuba seemed the next domino to fall. Unlike Eastern Europe, however; Cuba is not dominated by a corrupt and weakening communist party led by second or third-generation leaders who lack real political legitimacy. Cuba is dominated by a strong military and by the original leader that made the revolution. Despite diminishing popularity, Castro retains a degree of legitimacy. Not unlike Tito in Yugoslavia, Franco in Spain, and Mao in China, Castro is the leader who overthrew the old order and established the new. He conquered power by force and only will relinquish it either by force or in death. Once changes occurred in the Kremlin, and the Soviet leadership refused to intervene in Europe as it had in the past, anti-Soviet, nationalistic forces surfaced to take political control. No such circumstance exists in Cuba. The Cuban Communist Party is a Castro creation and a Castro-dominated institution. While receiving massive aid from the Soviet Union, Castro usually proclaimed his independence from the Soviets and appealed to Cuban nationalism. The leadership within the military and the party is Fidelista, loyal to the maxirnum leader. They apparently share and evidently follow the leader's views and commands. Either because of fear for their own safety, concern about a future without Castro, or shared ideology and power, they have generally remained loyal. Unlike those of Eastern Europe, Cuba's security apparatus is monolithic and highly centralized. Castro learned well the lesson of Romania, where forces from the ministry of the interior and the military fought each other. He eliminated possible rivals within his military and security forces and placed the ministry of the interior under the control of the military, headed by an officer he and Raúl trusted. The possibility of factionalism in the military is also diminished by the constant rotation of officers, which prevents the creation of personal loyalties within the services, and by tight supervision and control, both through electronic surveillance and through the party and counter-intelligence units within the military. Fear and distrust characterize the higher echelons of the military. Trusting no one, it is difficult for a disgruntled military leader to share his unhappiness with others or to plan actions against Fidel. Even if able to obtain the support of a few colleagues, it is impossible for unhappy officers to secure the support of a large number of military personnel whose loyalties and beliefs are unknown. Successful rebellion within the armed forces is, therefore, unlikely. Only in a situation of massive disturbances and popular upheaval in which the security apparatus is unable to establish order will the military be called in to repress the population. Under this scenario, it is likely that factionalism, desertions, and unrest would occur within the military, hastening the collapse of the Castro regime. Until now, the Castro brothers have refrained from using the military to deal with popular discontent, perhaps aware of the potential dangers involved. Among the Cuban people, there is a strong belief about the efficacy of the security services and an overwhelming fear of their repressive capabilities. Castro has dealt harshly with real and potential enemies; he has infiltrated and destroyed opposition groups and has prevented the development of any civilian group that threatens his authority. Recently, opponents of the regime have been given the choice of long imprisonment or exile. This is not to say that there is no opposition in Cuba. Opposition manifests itself in low productivity in the work place, alienation from the party and from the constant demands of the leadership, graft and corruption, and an increasing desire to leave the island. Independent groups of journalists and professionals, as well as religious organizations, have flourished recently under very difficult circumstances. Many of their leaders have shown enormous courage in defying the regime. Yet, it is likely that the security apparatus has infiltrated these groups and that they will eventually be discredited and destroyed. Fearing the system's repression and the dreaded possibility of long prison terms, Cubans seem resigned to await the end of the Castro era and the beginning of better times. Disillusionment and alienation characterize Cuban society in the late 1990s. Resistance and open defiance carries too high a price, a price Cubans are unwilling to pay. The possibility of regime continuity, therefore, seems stronger for Cuba than it was for other communist states. Although their end came suddenly and swiftly, it took decades of decay to weaken critically the East European regimes, and Soviet disengagement and acceptance were required to hasten their collapse. In Poland, where the trade union Solidarity was born in 1980 as the first nongovernment trade union in Communist history, a military-led government took control and remained in power for a decade. In China, the communist regime obtained a new lease on life following Mao's death in 1976, initially through Deng's reforms and then ultimately through increased repression, particularly against student protesters.
|
|||
|
||||
