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The Comandante's Reserves (continued) Cuban Banking In 1984, the Banco Financiero Internacional was founded, becoming the first Cuban entity operating with dollars in complete autonomy from the state system. It operates as a corporation whose owners are the Cuban government and some foreign investors who are suspected of acting as stand-ins for other persons. This enterprise is located in the CIMEX corporation. The apparent objective of this bank was to remove from the National Bank of Cuba transactions that were intended to leave no trace. The main clients of this bank, which has 16 branches in Cuba and an unknown number abroad (we know they exist in the United Kingdom and in Canada). are the same firms associated with the Comandante's reserves. El Banco de Inversiones, SA. is located in the Someillán building in Havana and forms part of an important mechanism that makes loans to the Cuban government at high interest rates. It is run by Héctor Rodríguez Llompart, ex-president of the National Bank of Cuba, and a Swiss-Israeli citizen named André. It is suspected that this bank's capital comes from the Banco Financiero Internacional. The operations of these two banks are so secretive that they give rise to many suspicions, including that they are involved in the laundering of drug money. The scandal involving the Grupo Oasis of Spain, which operated the tourist center at Cayo Largo, planted the seeds of this suspicion. The Comandantes reserves, both financial and physical, also benefit from many of the foreign donations Cuba receives, including, for example, the World Food Program of the FAO, which made many donations of milk to Cuba between the 1970s and 1990s. The milk was intended for infants in the eastern provinces of Cuba, but was diverted instead to Nicaragua for political purposes. Institutional Evolution The above information appears to confirm that the Cuban economy is undergoing a major institutional evolution, in which four economic subsystems are emerging. The first is Fidel Castro's economy, with his enterprises, financial institutions, and virtually absolute control of the country's resources. The second subsystem, in partnership with Castro's economy, consists of the foreign enterprises, allowed to generate and repatriate earnings at the cost of helping Castro's own finances. The third system is the remains of the old planned economy and public enterprises, including the sugar industry, still struggling for survival but in a general state of neglect and decay. The fourth system is the Cuban marginal private sector, consisting of those who are falling outside the other three systems (mainly the self-employed) and those who, though still working in the public sector, do not earn enough to make ends meet. It appears that the first two subsystems are thriving, while the latter two are carrying the burdens imposed by the predatory economics of the first two. In the aggregate, everything seems to indicate that the Cuban economy is in a freefall, with no visible solution, something similar to what happened to Zaire (now Congo) under Mobutu Sese Seko. Dollar remittances from exiled Cubans to relatives on the island are playing an important role in helping some weather the current economic crisis. However, the remittances, combined with the alleged foreign investment activity in Cuba, are offering Castro an excellent vehicle to hide money laundering activities. Forbes' estimate of Castro's fortune may very well fall short of the reality. from DevTech Systems, August 1997
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